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Abstract
Recent exonerations of convicted defendants by the efforts of advocates like the Innocence
Project are accompanied by a concerning finding that a large proportion of defendants had
falsely confessed to the alleged crime. False convictions result in due process violations and
suffering and stigma by the convicted and their families, in addition to imposing an economic
burden on the community. Prior research has identified structural interrogation practices and
individual characteristics that increase risk of false confessions, however knowledge on how to
identify true and false confessions is minimal and undeveloped. Cues to deception in false
statements may be an effective means of identifying true and false confessions. However, extant
research on deception detection has not been fully applied to confessions and paralinguistic cues
(e.g. pauses, pitch change) have never been tested. This study examined the efficacy of training
in paralingustic cues on the ability to identify true and false confessions. A second goal was to
assess the use of an online experimental survey as an alternative to traditional experiments. True
and false confessions to guilt-inducing or shame-evoking events were obtained through an
adaptation of Kassin, Meissner, & Norwick’s (2005) method. Participants (n = 63) from a second
sample were randomly assigned to receive training in paralingustic cues to deception or a
placebo training. Subsequently, participants rated perceived veracity of six confessions and their
confidence level in each judgment. Consistent with prior research, the results indicated that
accuracy rates were around chance levels and that confidence was unrelated to accuracy. The
accuracy rate of the paralingustic group did not significantly differ from the control group,
possibly due to random effects in treatment assignment. The paralingustic group indicated
significantly higher confidence than the control group, which highlights a troubling trend that
deception detection training increases confidence, but not accuracy in judgment. It is essential
for agents in the legal system - law enforcement, legal decision-makers, and forensic
psychologists - to be aware of empirically-supported cues to guilt or innocence in confessions in
order to prevent false convictions and preserve the legitimacy of the legal system.
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Introduction and Literature Review
In 1989, five black and Hispanic young men from the ages of 15 to 16 were arrested and
interrogated for the brutal rape of a white, upper-middle class female in Central Park. After many
hours of interrogation, they all confessed to the murder and all were eventually convicted.
Thirteen years later, the real attacker admitted to committing the crime and was matched on
DNA to the crime scene. A similar case of false conviction involved 11-year old Lacresha
Murray, who was accused of killing a toddler under her supervision in 1996. In interrogation, she
stated over 40 times that she did not hurt the toddler, before breaking down and admitting to an
accidental killing (Drizin & Colgan, 2004). A transcript of the interrogation suggests coercion
during the interrogation and coaching on the part of the detectives (Krzewinski, 2002). Lacresha
was given a 25-year prison sentence before an appeals court threw out her conviction in 1999.
These two famous cases, along with many others, have spurred researchers from the fields of
criminal justice, legal psychology, social psychology, and communication to ask why individuals
confess to crimes they did not commit and how the criminal justice system fails to accurately
identify false confessions.
The Role of Confessions
False convictions are increasingly recognized as an issue of concern for the legal system.
The Innocence Project, begun by Northwestern University, has played a prominent role in the
recognition of false convictions through their advocacy efforts to exonerate falsely convicted
offenders, some from death row. Exoneration has typically resulted after DNA testing, which
often was not an available technique during the time of the alleged offense, but also through
further investigation that revealed the true perpetrator or an alibi of the convicted individual
(Drizin & Leo, 2004). The strength of the Central Park Five and the Lacresha Murray cases
4
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against the accused lay in the presence of a confession. In 15-20% of DNA exonerations of
falsely convicted individuals, the evidence against the defendant included the presence of a
confession or admission to the crime (Drizin & Leo, 2004; Garrett, 2010; Scheck, Neufled, &
Dwyer, 2000), with even higher rates in capital cases (White, 2003).
A confession plays an important role in the decisions of judges and jury members. Legal
researchers have found that confession evidence leads to an increased likelihood of conviction,
even if the defense is able to present evidence indicating innocence and to demonstrate that the
confession was obtained through coercive means (Leo & Ofshe, 1998). Leo and Ofshe (1998)
reviewed 60 case studies of false convictions, finding that evidence indicating innocence was
overlooked or disregarded by judicial decision-makers when the accused had confessed to the
crime. Through an experimental study, Kassin & Neumann (1997) tested the weight of
confession evidence in comparison to eyewitness identification and character testimony. They
found that confession evidence was more incriminating than other types of evidence and
produced the highest rates of conviction. Thus, confession evidence is extremely important to
judicial decision-making. These findings can be corroborated by research indicating that
confessions, regardless of whether or not they are true, are more readily believed than denials
and judged as more honest (Levine, Kim, & Blair, 2010). Difficulty in assessing veracity (i.e.
truthfulness) appears to be a contributed to an inability to detect false confessions, as judges and
other legal decision-makers tend to focus on inaccurate cues to veracity when judging the
credibility of a defendant (Porter & ten Brinke, 2009).
Impact of False Convictions
It is important to identify true and false confessions – at key points of the judicial process
such as interrogation, the prosecutorial decision to charge, the trial, or the appeal – in order to
5
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protect the innocent against wrongful conviction and to maintain the legitimacy of the criminal
justice system. Wrongful convictions constitute a deviation from the presumed fairness and due
process of the legal system, which leads to a decreased perception of legitimacy (Williams,
2000). The 5th and the 14th Amendments to the Constitution guarantee a right to due process in
criminal justice proceedings, which researchers like Leo (2008) have indicated was lacking in
many interrogations leading to false confessions. False confessions have only recently been
brought to the forefront of the legal psychology research due to the recent exonerations of falsely
convicted individuals, however researchers throughout the 20th century had raised the issue that
police-induced false confessions are one of the leading causes of miscarriages of justice in
America (Bedau & Radelet, 1987; Borchard, 1932).
Beyond violating the due process protection of the innocent, false convictions are
harmful to the community. First, the criminal justice system spends time and resources in the
process of trying and convicting suspects. An enormous amount of money is spent in
incarcerating one individual, estimated to be $30,619 annually in the federal system (Federal
Registrar, 2015). False convictions have not only ramifications for the individual and the
legitimacy of the criminal justice system, but also economic implications for the expenditures of
the legal system and the taxpayers in the community that fund the system. Additionally, falsely
convicted individuals have been awarded large amounts of money through civil suits against the
state after exoneration (e.g. Drizin & Leo, 2004).
Second, wrongful convictions hold severe consequences for the families of the convicted,
who are called “secondary victims” of wrongful convictions in a study examining the
consequences of false convictions conducted by Jenkins (2013). Jenkins’ qualitative study
involved interviewing 132 individuals affected by false convictions, including 27 falsely
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convicted individuals or “primary victims”. He found that “secondary victims” - spouses,
children, and families - often suffer from psychological effects like anxiety, depression, panic
attacks, or post-traumatic stress symptoms and from financial hardship due to loss of income and
legal fees (Jenkins, 2013). While some families become estranged or disintegrate due to the legal
persecution and incarceration of the convicted family member, others persist in believing in the
innocence of the convicted family member. Further, even families that clung together through
the appeals process and the eventual release can experience severe consequences after
exoneration, such as difficulties for children in communicating or for a spouse in salvaging the
relationship with the “primary victim”.
False convictions and the subsequent harm to the individuals, families, and the
community need to be prevented. One approach is to develop better strategies for identifying
false confessions because such confessions are often the ‘nail in the coffin’ for falsely accused
individuals, as judicial decision-makers are unable to look past confession evidence. Many actors
in the legal system have responsibility to identify false confessions and circumstances that may
elicit false confessions. This includes police officers, detectives, prosecutors, judges, and jury
members, but also psychological experts who may play a role in the legal process. Psychologists
are often retained to diagnose a defendant’s mental state (e.g. competence, insanity) or evaluate
dangerousness or likelihood to recidivate (Tillbrook, Mumley, & Grisso, 2003). In order to
conduct an accurate evaluation, psychologists may also need to assess psychological effects of
interrogation (Volbert & Banse, 2014), and to understand who may be at increased risk of giving
a false confession due to individual characteristics. In sum, it is essential for all agents in the
legal system, including psychologists, to be aware of false confessions and to have knowledge of
risk factors and cues to guilt or innocence.
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Defining False Confessions
The most influential shift in false confession research was made by Kassin &
Wrightsman’s (1985) chapter, Confession Evidence, which set the stage for future research by
arguing for multiple causes of false confessions. Prior to this chapter, research had not examined
interactions between multiple individual and situational factors that may result in false
confessions. For instance, Bem (1966) conducted experimental studies on false confessions that
were attributed to the idea of self-persuasion or internalization of a false event due to the
approach of the interrogator. The concept of self-persuasion was explained through cognitive
dissonance - a change in attitude, belief, or behavior resulting from motivation to maintain
cognitive consistency in the face of conflicting ideas (Festinger, 1957). Contemporaneous events
such as American soldiers during the Korean War growing to believe the false confessions they
had given as prisoners of war partially influenced researchers’ focus on cognitive dissonance
(Brehm & Cohen, 1962).
In Confession Evidence, Kassin and Wrightsman delineated three types of false
confessions made in the context of criminal investigations: voluntary, coerced-compliant, and
coerced-internalized. Voluntary confessions are confessions that occur outside of an
interrogational context without specific elicitation. Voluntary false confessions usually indicate
underlying psychological disturbances, as has been seen in high profile crimes like the Lindbergh
kidnapping in the 1930s or the JonBenet Ramsey murder in the 1990s where multiple individuals
came forward with false confessions to the crimes (Leo, 2008). Coerced-compliant false
confessions are made when a suspect falsely admits his or her guilt to law enforcement because
of extreme methods, stress, pressure, or coercion in the interrogation context, but in actuality,
they continue believe in their own innocence. Coerced-internalized confessions characterize

8

APPLYING DECEPTION DETECTION TO TRUE AND FALSE CONFESSIONS

those confessions made by suspects that come to believe that they actually committed the
offense. As indicated by Kassin and Wrightsman (1985), the likelihood of coerced-compliant and
coerced-internalized confessions in interrogation can be increased due to certain factors in both
the interrogational context and within the individual.
Police Practices in Interrogation
The reasons for why innocent people give false confessions has been approached
primarily from the perspective of legal psychology and applied social psychology.
Comprehensive assessments of false confessions have focused on psychological processes of
structural practices in interrogation, and individual factors. The most influential guide to
interrogation, Criminal Interrogations and Confessions by Inbau, Reid, Buckley, & Jayne
(2001), provides a multi-step approach to getting a suspect to confess, which uses three
processes: (1) isolation in order to increase anxiety and a desire to escape, (2) confrontation that
includes accusations and citing real or false evidence against the suspect, and (3) minimization in
which the investigator justifies the crime and implies leniency in consequences once the suspect
confesses. These three situational processes are described by Kassin (2008) in terms of how they
may pressure an innocent and susceptible suspect to confess. The presentation of false evidence
against the suspect is particularly potent in inducing people to internalize blame and provide a
false confession, as was demonstrated through an experimental study by Kassin & Kiechel
(1996). Importantly, Criminal Interrogations and Confessions also provides lie detection training
in verbal, nonverbal, and behavioral cues to deception. However, the goal of the training is to
detect when a suspect may be lying by providing exculpatory statements (i.e. statements that
clear a suspect from alleged guilt), not when a suspect may be lying by providing false
confessions.
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Regarding the interrogational process, Kassin, Leo, Meissner, Richman, Colwell, Leach,
and La Fon (2007) conducted an extensive review of police practices in interrogation and their
beliefs about interrogational practices - the first study to use a self-report survey to assess police
interrogation techniques. The researchers surveyed 631 investigators across 16 police
departments in the United States and Canada with the goal describing the law enforcement’s
perspective on police interrogations and false confessions. The findings indicated that
investigators with more years of experience, special interrogational training, and greater
confidence in their own deception detection skills were more likely to presume guilt, endorse
more interrogational techniques, and to more frequently use psychological manipulation and
confrontation in interrogation. In terms of extant interrogational techniques, four factors of
interrogation were isolated through factor analyses: (1) isolation, rapport, and minimization, (2)
confrontation, (3) threatening the suspect, and (4) presentation of evidence. Under the first
factor, interrogational practices included sympathy, self-interest, developing a rapport, and
minimizing the offenses, as well as isolating the suspect. Confrontation practices include
contradicting what the suspect says, confronting the suspect, and interrupting denials.
Threatening practices circulated around threatening the suspect with punishment, demonstrating
frustration and anger, and physically intimidating the suspect. Finally, presentation of evidence
against the suspect may include failed polygraph exam results, eyewitness testimony or crime
scene photographs – which may be true or fabricated by the interrogator.
Kassin et al. (2007) also examined the investigators’ perceptions of the prevalence of
false confessions. Investigators indicated an average interrogation length of 1.6 hours with their
longest interrogation lasting an average of 4.2 hours. This finding is disproportionately shorter
than the average 16.4 hours of interrogation time in known false confession cases reviewed by

10

APPLYING DECEPTION DETECTION TO TRUE AND FALSE CONFESSIONS

Drizin and Leo (2004). Drizin and Leo (2004) found that known false confessions occurred in
extraordinarily lengthy interrogations - quite longer than normative police interrogation time. In
the Kassin et al. (2007) study, interrogators provided their own estimate of the self-incrimination
rate for innocent suspects, which was an average of 4.78% or nearly five out of every 100
confessions. Investigators themselves recognize the existence of false confessions, however it is
unclear how investigators’ decision or confidence that a confession is true or false is related to an
actual ability to detect false confessions.
In the case of the Central Park 5, multiple coercive interrogation practices were
apparently implemented by interrogations (Drizin & Leo, 2005). Two of the youth had been
interrogated throughout the night and the following day after their arrest. Although the
confessions were recorded on video, the earlier interrogation sessions leading up to the
confessions were not recorded. Throughout the trial, the youth and their families describes highly
coercive interrogations with physical slapping, yelling, and cursing. Several of the youth were
promised to be released from custody if they confessed to the crime, while one, Antron McCray,
was told that he would be treated as a witness, not as a suspect, if he admitted to participating in
the rape. One of the interrogating officers – Detective Thomas McKenna – later described how
he falsely told one of the youth – Yusef Salaam – of how his fingerprints were found on the
jogging shorts of the victim (Sullivan, 1990).
In addition to structural interrogation practices, stress due to police pressure certainly has
an additional influence on risk of false confessions (Ofshe & Leo, 1997; Gudjonsson, 2003).
However, researchers have suggested that the single strongest technique that induces false
confessions is the promises of leniency if the suspect confesses and promises of more punitive
outcome if the suspect does not (Leo, 2008). This forces a suspect to balance the immediate
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benefits of falsely confessing against the eventual risk and cost of prosecution. Those suspects
who believe that their innocence will eventually be brought to light despite a false confession in
the immediate future are more likely to give a false confession in interrogation (Gudjonsson,
2003; Kassin, 2005).
Individual Risk Factors
It is important to note that not everyone may be equally at risk for giving a false
confession because individual characteristics may contribute to falsely confessing above and
beyond a coercive interrogational context. Youth and intellectual disability tend to be risk-factors
for false confessions. Intellectual disability (previously called mental disability or mental
retardation) and lower Intelligence Quotient scores increase likelihood of falsely confessing in
interrogation (Leo, 2008; Kassin, Drizin, Grisso, Gudjonsson, Leo, & Redlich, 2010) because of
impairments in cognitive processing and increased compliancy (Drizin & Leo, 2004). Drizin and
Leo (2006) indicated an overrepresentation of youth as known false confessors, because
juveniles tend to be more impulsive and less able to perceive future risk and long-term
consequences (Owen-Kostelnik, Reppuci, & Meyer, 2006). The presence of a serious mental
illness and drug intoxication also increase risk of falsely confessing for a suspect (Redlich,
Kulish, & Steadman, 2011; Sigurdsson and Gudjonsson (1996).
Personality traits of compliancy and suggestibility may result in individuals changing
their memory based on what they are told under pressure (Gudjonsson, 2003) and developing a
belief that they actually committed the act that they are accused of committing – resulting in the
coerced-internalized confession type indicated by Kassin & Wrightsman (1985). Experimental
studies designed to test the ability of individuals to internalize suggested events have
implemented false memories such as being attacked by an animal (Porter, Yuille, & Lehman,
12
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1999), or cheating on a recent test (Russano, Meissner, Narchet, & Kassin, 2005). Shaw and
Porter (2015) found that in their false memory experiment that 70% of their participants
internalized (i.e. grew to believe) a false memory over multiple interrogational sessions about
committing a criminal event in their past (i.e. assault, assault with weapon, or theft) which had
been corroborated by evidence fabricated by the researcher.
These experimental studies raise concerns about the ease of internalization of false
confessions in the context of a confident interrogator, repeated interrogations, and corroboration
by external sources that serves as evidence. Biases of interrogators, coercive structural
interrogation practices, and individual risk factors may elicit false confessions during
interrogation. These findings have indicated the need for more objective, empirically-based
interrogation techniques that can also provide a safeguard against false confessions.
Using Psychological Research to Inform Interrogational Practices
In contrast to prevalent interrogational practices that may increase risk of false
confessions, researchers has advocated for the use of psychological research to inform sound
interrogational practices. Two broad approaches to conducting interrogations have been
suggested in order to accurately identify deceptive exculpatory statements, while minimizing
coercive practices that may elicit false confessions. The approaches entail the strategic-use of
evidence (SUE) technique and the theory of cognitive load (Blandón-Gitlin, Fenn, Masip, &
Yoo, 2014). These approaches differ from extant interrogational practices conducted by law
enforcement by relying on cognitive psychological research and by providing a context for
truthful statements to be identified by the nature of their statement.
The SUE technique involves the strategic disclosure of incriminating evidence in order to
test for statement inconsistencies and has been validated through several experiments (Hartwig,
13
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Granhag, Strömwall, & Kronkvist, 2006). However, the incriminating evidence should be real,
rather than false. Meissner & Kassin (2004) advise against the method of presenting false
evidence, which can take the form of an alleged failed polygraph, fingerprint, hair sample, or
eyewitness because presenting false evidence can influences both guilty and innocent
confessions. It is not unreasonable to suppose that some of the individual risk factors – juvenile
status, intellectual impairment, or intoxication – may increase the risk of innocent suspect of
perceiving incontrovertible evidence against them and eliciting feelings of hopelessness.
The concept of cognitive load is based on the premise that additional cognitive work is
necessary to facilitate a lie in comparison to telling the truth because lying is more demanding of
cognitive processes (Blandón-Gitlin et al., 2014). Telling a deceptive story is more cognitively
taxing because the deceiver needs to formulate the lie and mask the truth, in addition to
monitoring their own demeanor and behavior to appear honest to the interviewer (DePaulo &
Kirkendol, 1989) and monitoring the interviewer’s reactions and behavior to access their own
success at deception (Buller & Burgoon, 1996). It is important to note that practical safeguards,
such as video-recoding of interrogations, are additionally necessary to minimize coercive police
interrogations (Kassin, Appleby, & Perillo, 2010).
Although the theory of cognitive load has only received wide attention recently (Vrij,
Fisher, Mann, & Leal, 2006), researchers have begun to test multiple techniques designed to
increase cognitive load. Walczyk, Schwartz, Clifton, Adams, Wei, & Zha (2005) suggest asking
a suspect close-ended questions under time pressure. (Evans, Michael, Meissner, & Brandon,
2013) tried to increase cognitive load by asking participants to describe events in their second
language, rather than their primary language. Vrij, Mann, Fisher, Leal, Milne, & Bull (2008)
conducted two studies that increased cognitive load for “suspects” by asking them to recount
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their stories in reverse order (i.e. starting from the end of the story and tracing the steps
backwards to the beginning). The reverse-order stories that were false contained more cues to
deception in comparison to a control group that told their stories in chronological order from
beginning to end. Furthermore, police officer participants that assessed veracity where 18% more
likely to detect deception when considering reverse-order false stories in comparison to
chronological false stories (60% accuracy in comparison to 42% accuracy).
The principle of cognitive load may provide an effective psychological framework for
developing deception detection techniques. The cognitive load for a suspect who is telling a
truthful statement will be different from the cognitive load for a suspect who is telling a
deceptive statement due to increased cognitive processing needed to tell a false story (Vrij et al.,
2008; Blandón-Gitlin et al., 2014). As will be indicated later, cognitive load also is the
psychological basis for empirically-supported deception detection cues that can be used to
distinguish between true and deceptive statements.
Deception Detection in Practice
Deception detection is necessary for investigators and judicial decision-makers to
evaluate the guilt or innocence of a suspect. Unfortunately, considerable research across a variety
of individuals – law enforcement officers, judges, jury-members, college students - suggests that
participants are generally poor at detecting deception, doing so around chance levels, both in
social contexts and criminal interrogations (Akehurst, Köhnken, Vrij, Bull, 1997; Bond &
DePaulo, 2006; Bond & DePaulo, 2008; DePaulo, Lassiter, & Stone, 1982; Ekman &
O’Sullivan, 1991; Memon, Vrij, & Bull, 2003; ten Brinke & Porter, 2013; Vrij, 2000). Vrij
(2000) concluded that accuracy rates of professional investigators range from 45% to 60%,
averaging around 54% accuracy. A meta-analysis of 108 studies on deception detection by
15
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Aamodt & Custer (2006) concluded that individual differences, including age, gender, education,
law enforcement experience, and confidence were all unrelated to the ability to detect deception.
These unimpressive findings regarding deception detection by professionals and laypersons
emphasize the importance of finding an objective means of identifying deception and
implementing effective training in deception detection. Unfortunately, researchers have also
found that deception detection accuracy does not appear to increase with experience or training
(DePaulo & Pfeifer, 1986; Leach, Talwar, Lee, Bala, Lindsay, 2004; Kassin & Fong, 1999;
Köhnken, 1987).
Despite the fact that many professional investigators claim that their experience in
interrogation enhanced their skill in detecting deception, Kassin, Norwick, & Meissner (2005)
found that investigators with prior interrogation experience had poorer accuracy than students
with no prior interrogation experience in identifying true and false confessions of criminal
offenders. Further, there was no relationship between years of experience and accuracy.
Investigators had higher confidence in their deception detection abilities – a finding which is
supported by other researchers who have found that investigators believe in a “sixth sense” for
detecting deception (Leo, 1996), despite no actual correlation being found between level of
confidence and accuracy. Further, investigators were more likely to judge make judgements of
guilt regardless of veracity by judging both true and false confessions to be “true” as an
admission of guilt, demonstrating a “guilt bias”. Burgoon, Buller, Ebesu, & Rockwell (2009)
also found a guilt bias on the part of military intelligence investigators because the investigators
demonstrated impairment in judging accuracy when investigators suspected that the individual
under interrogation was guilty. Their study further indicated that, overall, accuracy rates were
higher with identifying true rather than false statements. Despite the “guilt bias” of investigators
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in interrogation, the participants who are not investigators tend to be more accurate at identifying
true statements in comparison to deceptive or false statements (Levine, Park, & McCornack,
1999; Vrij & Baxter, 1999). This finding is explained as natural because the majority of
statements heard from others – both face-to-face and online - tend to be truthful (Hancock,
2007).
The presumption of guilt on the part of trained investigators sets into motion processes
during interrogation that may ultimately serve to confirm interrogators’ expectations. Kassin,
Goldstein, & Savitsky (2003) conducted an experimental study with undergraduate students
posing as “interrogators” or “suspects” during a mock interrogation. Half of the “interrogators”
were led to believe that a suspect was guilt and the other half were led to believe a suspect was
innocent. In the experiment, half of the “suspects” were actually guilty of carrying out a mock
theft and half were innocent. The results of this 2 (guilty expectation vs. innocent expectation) x
2 (actual guilt vs. actual innocent) experiment, found that interrogators with guilty expectations
were 23% more likely to judge guilt. Expectations of guilt led to more guilt-presumptive
questions and a greater variety of interrogational techniques. Moreover, actual guilt or innocence
interacted paradoxically with expectations as interrogators demonstrated more aggression with
innocent suspects, which in turn constrained the behavior of the suspects and led the
interrogators to perceive guilt.
The confirmation bias in interrogation indicates that plausible denials may be discounted
or misinterpreted as investigators will selectively seek and interpret new information in a way
that verifies their belief of guilt (Kassin & Gudjonsson, 2004). Kassin et al. (2003) further
suggest that this conformation bias may exacerbate the problem that police interrogators are
overconfident in their ability to detect true and false statements. The lack of accuracy in
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deception detection – demonstrated across investigators and laypersons – raises the question of
what methods exist for identifying true and false statements. Do these methods actually increase
accuracy of deception detection and, if so, are they applicable specifically to confession
statements?
Distinguishing Between True and False Statements
Identification of true and false confessions has received limited attention from the
deception detection field. Experts may hesitate to label a false confession as deceptive due to the
lack of outright intent or motivation to profit by deception. Moreover, the deception in an
exculpatory statement may differ from deception in a false confession, as suggested by research
indicating that advance preparation of a lie may result in a “larger quantity of words”, while
lying on the spot without advance preparation may result in less words begin said in comparison
to a truthful statement (Burgoon & Qin, 2006).
Although false confessions and deliberate deceptions may differ in intent, both types of
false statements share the quality of being falsified as the story provided by the individual is not
based on an actual experience and originates internally. Johnson & Raye (1981) distinguished
between externally-originating events that are based on actual experience and internallyoriginating events that are based on a fabrication and suggested that the two types of events are
qualitatively different. Their research was based on the Undeutsch hypothesis, which suggests
that qualitative and quantitative differences exist between true and deceptive statements
(Undeutsch, 1982). Rather than considering that the motivation of the “deception” in true and
false confessions excludes them from the category of “deception”, the present study sought to
connect deception detection research with confessions based on fundamental differences between
truthful and false statements. The Undeutsch hypothesis and Johnson & Raye’s (1981)’s
18
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categorization of externally-originating and internally-originating events, serve as the
foundation for considering deception detection research in the context of true and false
confession.
Deception detection research has approached cues to deception in three general
directions: nonverbal cues (e.g. eye contact, posture), paralinguistic (also known as vocal or
auditory) cues (e.g. pauses, pitch change), and verbal cues (e.g. amount of detail, negative
words). Overall, research has failed to support the majority of nonverbal cues to deception
detection (Vrij, 2008a). Prior to the 1980s, research focusing on nonverbal deception detection
primarily considered behaviors like facial expressions, posture shifting, gaze aversion,
movements of the hands and feet (e.g. Ekman & Friesen, 1969; 1974, Ekman, Friesen, &
O’Sullivan, 1988). Complex and objective methodologies using automatic, computerized
technology to assess nonverbal body language like movement and position of the face and hands
have even been proposed (Meservy et al., 2005). Despite the expectation of empirical support for
a widely accepted nonverbal indicator of deception - micro-expressions (i.e. short-span facial
expressions that constitute “emotional leakage” of a lie that cannot be suppressed) - Porter & ten
Brinke (2010) found no published empirical research on micro-expressions. Even the polygraph,
which is the most widely used technological device for lie detection, raises concerns among
researchers due to a high false positive rate (Vrij, 2008a). The polygraph is an instrument that
measures physiological arousal by recording heart rate, blood pressure, breathing rate, and skin
conductance (i.e. how easily the skin conducts a small current of electricity due to perspiration)
(Bartol & Bartol, 2015). While the polygraph is used by various government agencies, its lack of
acceptance by the general scientific community has led to its being inadmissibility in court as
evidence by the prosecution (Myers, Latter, & Abdollahi-Arena, 2006).
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The gold-standard for interrogation – the Reid technique - claims an 85% accuracy level
in detecting deception or truth by using a combination of nonverbal cues like gaze aversion or
frozen posture, behavioral attitudes like anxiousness or guardedness, and verbal cues like
rehearsed-sounding responses (Kassin et al., 2007). The Reid technique has been established as
training for hundreds of thousands of investigators across the world (John E. Reid & Associates,
2004). However, experimental studies have found that training in the Reid technique fails to
improve judgement accuracy in distinguishing true and false denials both among college students
(Kassin & Fong, 1999) and among experienced investigators (Meissner & Kassin, 2002),
although the confidence of trained investigators in their judgments increases.
Deception detection training provided to professionals often boasts empirical support,
which may contribute to investigators’ increased confidence – the strength of their belief that a
judgment of truth or deception is accurate. Vrij (2008b) points out that police officers in
interrogation focus heavily on nonverbal behaviors, specifically visual cues like gaze, movement,
or posture, which is recommended in the Reid method (Inbau et al., 2001), while neglecting to
examine the speech of a suspect (i.e. verbal and paralingustic cues). However, when
investigators focus on speech-related or verbal cues, their deception detection accurate rates tend
to increase in comparison to those simply observing visual behavior (Vrij, 2008a). Further,
focusing on speech in interrogation would have a secondary effect of encouraging the suspect to
talk, providing additional possible cues to deception, and giving the investigator a wider breadth
of speech to examine (Vrij, Mann, Kristen, & Fisher, 2007).
Many investigators claim that training or years of experiences provide them with an
intuitive ability to detect deception (Kassin et al., 2005). Intuitive or subjective deception
detection abilities have not been supported by research. Anderson, DePaulo, Ansfield, Tickle &
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Green (1999) found that laypeople rely on common-knowledge or cues to deception that are not
empirically-supported when making an intuitive judgement of veracity. A study by Garrido,
Masip, & Herrero (2004) found that police officer participants demonstrated a chance probability
of detecting deception, while students achieved a higher rate of accuracy, which the researchers
attributed to a focus on inaccurate cues to deception. Moreover, intuitive judgement fails to
demonstrate test-retest reliability, meaning that the same results are not yielded across different
investigators or different points in time, which has been demonstrated in both experimentallymanipulated and naturalistic contexts (Leach, 2006). This further indicates the fallibility of
interrogators’ confidence in their deception detection accuracy.
Despite the discouraging findings of many studies, the deception detection field has
indicated that taking into account or focusing on certain verbal or paralingustic cues can improve
deception detection (Vrij, 2008a). For instance, Vrij, Edward, & Bull (2001) found that direct
assessment (i.e. asking if an individual is lying) does not result in accurate identification of
deception by police officers, but using empirically-supported cues such as speech hesitations or
latency period (i.e. number of words per minute of speech) did result in greater accuracy. These
positive findings regarding verbal and paralingustic cues to deception suggest that analyzing the
speech of a confession statement for empirically-supported indicators of veracity may provide a
way of distinguishing between true and false confessions.
Applying Deception Detection to Confessions
Several studies have directly examined the applicability of empirically-supported
deception detection cues from research to true and false confessions. These studies used content
analyses to examine suspect statements (Garrett, 2010; Willén & Strömwall, 2012; Appleby,
Hasel, & Kassin, 2013) rather than testing the efficacy of deception detection cues in identifying
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true and false confessions. First, Appleby et al. (2013) conducted a content analysis of false
confessions that indicated that false confessions are more than mere admissions of guilt; rather,
they contain a rich and textured account of the crime along with an explanation of the motive.
Additionally false confessions contain accurate crime details, which tend to be more convincing
to juries. However, this inclusion of accurate crime details is suggested to be due to the
confrontation of the suspect with evidence such as pictures of the victim or crime scene during
interrogation. This process, Appleby et al. (2013) argue, gives the suspect information to draw
from when providing the false confession. These findings are supported by a previous content
analysis by Garrett (2010), which also found accurate crime details in false confessions that,
according to investigators, “only the perpetrator could have known”. Appleby et al. (2013)
address deception detection cues by qualifying the crime scene details as visual and auditory
details. This categorization is consistent with prior research that suggests verbal cues can
indicate, contrary to this content analysis, higher levels of truthfulness (Vrij, 2008a). However,
as can be seen from the Appleby et al. (2013) and Garret (2010) studies, extensive visual and
auditory details - a form of verbal cues to deception – were found in false confessions. This
conflicts with the research on true and false statements in general that indicates lower amounts of
various types of details (e.g. contextual, spatial) in false statements (Masip, Sporer, Garrido, &
Herrero, 2005).
Willén & Strömwall (2012) tested the ability of verbal cues to deception to distinguish
between true and false confessions of criminal defendants. The researchers sought to find out if
two specific measures – Statement Validity Analysis (SVA) or Reality Monitoring (RM) - are
able to distinguish between true and false confessions either. The Undeutsch hypothesis of
qualitative and quantitative differences between true and false statements formed the basis for
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clinically-developed SVA measure and the empirically-based RM measure (Köhnken, 2004;
Johnson, 1988). These two measures were originally intended for determining veracity of
victims’ stories, but they have been adapted by researchers for use with suspects (Porter &
Yuille, 1995; Sporer, 1997; 2004). Willén & Strömwall (2012) found that neither measure
wholly distinguished between true and false confessions, however certain individual criteria did.
As the authors point out, this does not dismiss the validity of those measures, but merely
indicates their inapplicability to criminal confessions as obtained in this particular study. Despite
this, three of the individual criteria did distinguish between true and false confessions. Consistent
with Appleby et al. (2013), remorse or apologies (i.e. self-deprecation) were found at higher
rates in false confessions. Willén & Strömwall (2012) found that higher rates of doubts about
testimony are present in false confessions in comparison to true confessions, however, a metaanalysis by Vrij (2008a) failed to confirm that finding. The only other significant criterion was
unexpected complications (i.e. tangential or irrelevant information) – more likely to be found in
true statements. Again, this criterion received only limited support in Vrij’s (2008a) metaanalysis. Studies examining verbal cues have found varied reliability of established cues, such as
those from the reality monitoring approach (Masip et al., 2005, Porter & Yuille, 1996).
In summary, the verbal and the paralingustic cues have gathered more support than
nonverbal or body language cues in the deception detection literature, however verbal cues may
be differentially related to true and false confessions than to true and false statements in general.
In practice, deception detection researchers who aim to increase empirically-based police
interrogational practices advise against the use of non-verbal or body language cues in favor of a
focus on the speech of a suspect – the verbal and paralingustic cues that may be present (Vrij,
2008; Vrij, Mann, Kristen, & Fisher, 2007). Porter & ten Brinke (2010) provide a review of
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relevant literature on nonverbal, verbal, and paralinguistic cues to deception. In their review,
they point out the efficacy of both the verbal and paralinguistic approaches, while concluding
that certain paralingustic cues fall among the most supported cues to deception – pauses,
repetition, response latency, speech rate. Specific verbal and paralingustic cues associated with
deception and truth-telling are summarized below. This study considered both verbal and
paralingustic cues to deception for application to true and false confessions. The cues considered
in this study were identified based on empirical-support and reliability in the research literature
(See Table 1). Ultimately, the verbal cues were dropped from consideration due to estimations of
low sample size and concerns about a differential relationship to confessions statements (e.g.
Appleby et al., 2013); however, they are presented here for descriptive purposes for
consideration by future research.
Verbal Cues
Research on verbal or linguistic differences in deception detection indicates that
deceptive individuals tend to use fewer first-person pronouns or self-references (e.g. “I”, “my”,
“me”), more negative emotion words (e.g. “hate”, “worthless”, “enemy”) or negative
statements, and fewer “exclusive” words that demonstrate a cognitive complexity to a story (e.g.
“except”, “without”, “but”) (Newman et al., 2003). The use of lower self-references is also
supported through experimental research by Feeley & deTurk (1998). Deceptive statements are
less likely to be direct, relevant, logically-organized, and clear (DePaulo, Malone, Lindsay,
Muhlenbruck, Charlton, & Cooper, 2003) (i.e. immediacy cues). Fuller, Biros, Burgoon,
Nunamaker (2013) found the following constructs associated with deception: lower quantity (e.g.
word quantity), lower lexical diversity (e.g. content word diversity, redundancy) and higher
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uncertainty (e.g. generalizing terms), both of which are supported by additional research (Janux
2014).
Paralingustic Cues
In comparison to the verbal cues, which require a content analysis of speech,
paralingustic cues require attention to the quality of production of the speech itself. Burgoon and
Qin (2006), DePaulo et al. (2003), Davis, Markus, Walters, Vorus, & Conners (2005), Sporer &
Schwandt (2006), Porter & ten Brinke (2010) indicate that consecutively repeating a phrase or
word in speech can be indicative of deception (i.e. repetition). Speech errors fall under the
paralinguistic category as research indicating that non-fluent or difficult to understand speech
that may include grammatical errors, sentence incompletion, or slips of the tongue may indicate
deception (Kraut, 1980; Feeley & deTurck, 1998; Vrij, 2008a; Zuckerman, DePaulo, &
Rosenthal, 1981). Pitch has also been examined as a cue, with research indicating that higher
pitch is associated with deception (Vrij, 2008a). Characteristics of pauses have also been
examined with higher frequency of pauses, longer pause duration (i.e. pause within speaker’s
own speech), response latency (i.e. pause between when an interlocutor stops and the speaker
begins to speak), and presence of speech hesitations (e.g. um, uh) within pauses (Vrij, 2008a,
Janux, 2014). A variety of studies indicate that the number of words can be an important cue to
deception with lower speech time (i.e. time spent talking) associated/predicting with deception
(Feeley & deTurck, 1998, Vrij, 2008a). Studies by Feeley & deTurck (1998) & Vrij, Edward, &
Bull (2001) also supported the findings that speech hesitations or latency period (i.e. number of
words per minute of speech) can be indicative of deception.
Certain paralinguistic cues like increased latency (i.e. time lapse between question and
answer), speech hesitations (use of “ums” “uhs” or “ers”), speech errors, and a slower rate of
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speech are associated with increased cognitive load (Goldman-Eisler, 1968, Smith & Clark,
1993, & Sporer & Schwandt, 2006). Cognitive load, previously mentioned as a focus of
interrogational practices relying on empirically-supported psychological research, lends support
to the investigation of paralingustic cues to deception in the search for indicators of veracity in
confessions, as was done in the present study. However, it is important to note that there does not
appear to be broad consensus in the research literature on certain cues. For example, Fuller,
Biros, & Wilson (2008) found that cues of generalizing terms, lexical diversity, and speech time
are significant in regression models as predictors of veracity, while cues such as pauses and
repetition are not significant. Differences are also observed based on amount of preparation for
the lie; for instance, unprepared lies demonstrated a longer response latency period in
comparison to prepared lies (Porter & ten Brinke, 2010). These studies highlight the need for
research to further examine the categorization of deception detection cues.
Table 1
Cues to Deception Detection Considered for Inclusion
Verbal

Paralinguistic

Placebo/Control

Negative Statements - Higher use of
denials, negative emotion words, or
disparaging statements can indicate
deception.

Pitch - Deceptive individuals are more
likely to have a higher pitch in their
speech.

Personality Disorders (e.g. narcissistic,
borderline, antisocial, or histrionic) - Individuals
with these disorders tend to be more confident
and skilled in lying.

Generalizing Terms - Higher use of
generalizing terms like "always", "never",
"nobody" can indicate deception.

Pauses - Longer pause durations in speech
can indicate deception.

Extroversion vs. Introversion - Extroverts
typically lie more than introverts; however,
introverts display more cues to deception.

Self-references - Lower use of selfreferences (e.g. “I”, “me”, or “mine”) and
higher use of group-references (e.g. “we”)
can indicate deception.

Talking - Individuals tend to spend less
time talking or give overall shorter
statements when being deceptive.

Immediacy cues - Failing to be direct,
relevant, logically-organized, and clear can
indicate deception.

Repetition - Consecutively repeating a
phrase or word in speech can indicate
deception.

Self-Monitoring - High self-monitoring (i.e.
controlling behavior in front of others) may
enable deception skills, but strong selfconsciousness tends to make a less believable
impression.
Cross-Cultural Deception Detection - Cultures
may define deception differently and it is more
difficult to detection deception across cultures
than within a culture.

Lexical diversity - Failing to use a variety
of words in speech can indicate deception.

Speech Errors - Speech that is non-fluent
or not understandable, grammatical errors,
sentence incompletion, slips of the tongue
may indicate deception.

Language Differences - Deception detection is
more difficult when speaking with someone in a
foreign language, partly because it may
automatically elevate uncertainty and tension.
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The Present Study
This study bridges empirically-supported deception detection cues with the practice of
identifying of true and false confessions. With the goal of identifying an applicable deception
detection approach or valid cues to evaluate confession evidence, this study tests the efficacy of
training in deception detection in the context of audio-recorded true and false confessions.
Previous research applying deception detection cues to true and false confessions have only
focused on verbal cues. This study seeks to test the efficacy of paralinguistic cues, which have
not previously been examined in the context of confessions.
The study used an online experimental survey to evaluate the efficacy of paralingustic
cues in judging veracity of true and false confessions. The survey presented a training video and
subsequently presented six audio-recorded confessions – half of which were true and half false –
for participants to rate as true or false. In the interest of comparing verbal and paralinguistic cues,
the survey was initially designed with two training videos and one control video. Due to
expectations of a low response rate, concerns about applicability of verbal cues to confession
statements, and potential difficulties in participant interpretation of verbal cues, only the
paralinguistic training condition and the control condition were retained. The control training
video presented general deception detection information (e.g. cultural considerations in
deception detection) that were unlikely to be relevant to the stimuli (i.e. true and false
confessions) (See Table 1 for control condition cues). Verbal cues were dropped from
participants partially because prior studies raised concerns about reliability and difficulties in
assessment (i.e. content analysis) (e.g. Porter & Yuille, 1996, Appleby et al., 2013, Willén &
Strömwall, 2012). Further, Porter & ten Brinke (2010)’s review of deception detection cues
indicated that certain paralingustic cues are highly supported by the research, including pauses
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and repetition, while verbal cues are more likely to require “knowledge of its proper manner of
interpretation”. Lastly, while prior research has examined the applicability of verbal cues to
deception, the examination of relevant paralingustic cues to true and false confessions is a novel
contribution by this study.
This study design is unique in using an online survey with embedded video and audio to
conduct an experiment on deception detection. While previous experimental studies (e.g. Kassin
et al., 2005, Vrij, Edward, & Bull, 2001) relied on in-person meetings to administer training and
collect data, this study conducts both through an online survey, which demands less time and
resource investment by researchers. A secondary goal of this study was to evaluate the online
experimental survey design which is able to (1) randomly assign participants into experimental
and control conditions, (2) administer training and stimuli embedded in the survey, (3) recruit
greater numbers of participants that may be difficult to access or recruit in person.
Research Questions
Research Question 1 (RQ1). This study evaluates if conducting online experimental
studies on deception detection is an effective alternative to traditional, in-person experiments.
Response rates, attribution, missing data, and time to completion data will be examined in a
qualitative assessment of the methodology.
RQ2. Prior studies have found that individuals are generally poor at detecting deception
or ascertaining veracity of confessions, with accuracy rates around 50% or at chance levels (Vrij,
2008a). Further this finding holds true across different professions, training, and years of
experience (Aamodt & Custer, 2006). Are accuracy rates in identifying true and false
confessions are also around chance levels? It is expected that overall accuracy rates for both
conditions combined will not deviate significantly from chance (50%).
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RQ3. Past research finds that training in deception detection increases confidence in
deception detection abilities, however it appears that confidence is not actually associated with
accuracy. This raises concerns investigators who receive deception detection training will be
overconfident in their abilities (e.g. Kassin et al., 2005). The association between accuracy and
confidence of participants in this study will be examined. It is expected that there will also be no
significant correlation between confidence and accuracy. Furthermore, participants are expected
to overestimate their abilities by providing ratings of confidence above the midpoint of the
confidence rating scale.
RQ4. Empirically-supported paralingustic cues may increase accuracy in judging veracity
of confessions. Despite the discouraging findings of many prevalent lie detection trainings or
techniques, relevant training in empirically-based cues can increase accuracy rates (Vrij, 2008a).
As paralingustic cues have not previously been tested with confessions, this study examines if
participant receiving training in paralingustic cues will have higher accuracy in detecting true
and false confessions in comparison to participants receiving a placebo training. It is
hypothesized that training in paralinguistic cues will lead to a higher rate of accuracy in
comparison to the control group.
RQ5. The general public demonstrates an overall increased accuracy with identifying true
statements in comparison to false statements (Burgoon, Buller, Ebesu, & Rockwell, 2009;
Levine, Park, & McCornack, 1999; Vrij & Baxter, 1999). This question, however, has not been
examined with regard to confessions. Will participants demonstrate a higher rate of accuracy in
identifying true confessions relative to false confessions? It is expected that accuracy rates of
identifying true confessions will be higher than accuracy rates of identifying false confessions
across both groups of participants.
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RQ6. If confidence increases as a result of training, will the control group with the
placebo training also demonstrate increased confidence in judgments of veracity? Differences in
confidence ratings across groups may not be demonstrated, given that the participants in the
placebo condition are unaware of the irrelevance of their training to the stimuli. Alternatively,
participants in control group are unlikely to find their cues to deception relevant to the stimuli,
thus, they may not be less confident in their judgments.
RQ7. To test the efficacy of the trainings, the utility of specific paralingustic or placebo
training cues to participants’ decision-making will be examined. To this end, the frequency of
cues from the trainings indicated by participants to be relevant to their judgment of a confession
as true or false will assessed.
Methods
This study evaluated the effects of empirically-based video education (i.e. training) in
deception detection on identification of true and false confessions and consisted of two phases.
Phase 1 consisted of participant interviews to obtain audio-recorded true and false confessions to
events that elicit emotions of guilt or embarrassment. To obtain true and false confessions, the
methodology from Kassin, Meissner, and Norwich’s (2005) study was adapted for use in this
study. The audio-recorded confessions obtained in Phase I were used as stimuli in Phase II.
Phase II used an experimental survey to administer training in deception detection to participants
and to subsequently present stimuli (i.e. audio-recorded confessions) to test their ability to
identify true and false confessions. Phase II employed a 2x2 experimental design to test the
efficacy of deception detection training in paralinguistic cues. The first independent variable (IV)
manipulated was veracity (i.e. truthfulness) with two levels: truth and falseness. The second IV
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was the deception detection training type (i.e. paralingustic vs. control). The primary dependent
variables measured were the judgment of veracity (i.e. true vs. false) and level of confidence.
Phase I Participants
The participants were 11 graduate students at a major university in the Pacific Northwest
who were recruited through flyer invitation from eight different departments. Phase 1
participants were required to be graduate students due to the intent to distribute the survey in
Phase 2 solely to undergraduate students. In order to avoid any overlap of participants, graduate
student status was a requirement for participation in Phase I and undergraduate student status
was a requirement for participation in Phase II.
Phase I Procedure
Participants were asked to provide a true confession (Part A) and a false confession (Part
B) by the researcher during a private interview. The confession was recorded in the form of a
story told by the participant and the single prompting question by the researcher was excluded
from the audio-recording. To maintain confidentiality, participants were asked to avoid using full
names, specific locations, or other information that could lead to their identification. Further,
participants were told that absolute confidentiality cannot be guaranteed because the audiorecordings that may be played for participants in future studies. They were asked to consider any
possible negative consequences if the content of their true confession was linked to their identity.
These consequences, which were delineated in a checklist on the consent form, included harm to
reputation (1), psychological harm such as anxiety or depression (2), risk of loss of employment
or employability (3), risk of damage to personal or professional relationships (4), criminal or
civil liability or consequences (5). Audio-recorded confessions were only collected from
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participants who confirmed that none of the consequences in the checklist could result from a
loss of confidentiality through identification by signing a consent to release the audio-recordings.
In Part A (i.e. true confession), participants were asked to identify a recent event or act in
their past that elicited emotions of guilt or embarrassment and to provide a two to three minute
confession to that event or act, providing as much detail as they deemed necessary. Once the
researcher completed the instructions, the participant was given up to 5 minutes prepare to tell
their true confession. Afterwards the researcher began the audio-recording and the participant
provided their true confession. The true and false confessions were collected using a “yoked”
procedure adapted from Kassin, Meissner, and Norwick’s (2005) study. The first participant
provided a true confession, then that true confession was condensed by the researcher into a short
paragraph that detailed the "who, what, where, when, and why" of the confession. This short
paragraph was provided in typed form to the second participant to be used as a prompt to devise
a false confession. This procedure was repeated for all participants.
In Part B (i.e. false confession), each participant was instructed to imagine as if they
experienced the story provided to them and to devise a two to three minute confession to that
event or act, providing as much detail as they deemed necessary. Participants were given up to 5
minutes to prepare their false confession. After this time, the researcher began the audio
recording and the participant provided their false confession. In compensation for their
participation, each participant was awarded a $15.00 gift certificate to a local store. The “yoked”
procedure was repeated until a total of 18 confessions were obtained from participants, 9 true and
9 false. For the survey in Phase II, three true and three false confessions were randomly selected
to be included in the survey. Efforts were taken to avoid selection of two confessions of the same
event (i.e. a true and false confession to the same event or act by two different participants), two
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confessions by the same individual (i.e. a true and false confession provided by the same
participant), and confessions whose audio-recording was compromised (e.g. background noise).
Phase II Participants
Participants were 63 undergraduate students at a major university in the Pacific
Northwest. 60 participants provided full demographical information. Considering the
undergraduate sample, age was relatively well-represented: 44.8% (n = 26) of participants were
18-21, 25.9% (n = 15) were 22-25, 6.9% (n = 4) were 26-29, 15.5% (n = 9) were 30-39, and
6.9% (n = 4) were 40-59. 69.0% (n = 40) of participants identified as female, 29.3% (n = 17)
identified as male, and 1.7% (n = 1) participants identified as ‘other’. 67.2% (n = 39) of the
sample identified as White or European American, 8.6% (n = 5) identified as Asian, 6.9% (n = 4)
identified as Black or African American, 2.7% (n = 1) identified as Native American/Native
Alaskan, 10.3% (n = 6) identified their race as ‘other’, and 5.1% (n = 3) identified with more
than one race category. Within the sample, 5.2% (n = 3) of participants identified their ethnicity
as Hispanic, 72.4% (n = 42) identified as White/Non-Hispanic, and 22.4% (n = 13) identified
their ethnicity as ‘other’. This sample was considered to be representative of the demographics
the institution’s population.
Phase II Experimental Procedure
The experimental survey was administered online through Qualtrics software to participants,
who were randomly assigned to the experimental group or the control group by the software. The
deception detection trainings were delivered by video and embedded in the survey from publicdomain YouTube videos. All video trainings used in the experiment were obtained through Dr.
Norah Dunbar’s course on deception detection from the University of Oklahoma (Janux, 2014).
In each video, Dr. Dunbar, a researcher in communication and deception detection, presented
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training on deception detection and covered the following studies: DePaulo et al., (2003), Feeley
and De Turck (1998), Mann, Vrij, Leal, Warmelink, and Forrester (2012), and Vrij (2008a).
The experimental group received a training video on paralingustic cues to deception, while
the control group received a placebo video that provided general deception detection information
such as personality influences and cross-cultural differences. None of the cues covered in the
placebo training video were referenced in any confession obtained in Phase I. The placebo
training primed a participant for deception detection without providing any cues to deception that
were relevant to the confessions. DePaulo, Lassiter, and Stone (1982) indicate that priming for
deception detection has an effect on deception detection accuracy even when only instructing
participants to focus on certain cues. Using a placebo training condition instead of a “no
training” condition provided a closer match between the two groups in order to allow for the
effect of paralinguistic training to be detected, rather than an effect of any training that primes a
participant to detect deception.
From the paralingustic and placebo videos, five of the most salient deception cues
covered in the video were summarized below the video for the participants. The deception
detection cues and their summaries are shown in Table 1 by training type. Participants were
asked to think about these cues when completing the audio-recordings. Due to different
quantities of applicable cues from each video, certain cues were added from the research
literature to the text below the video in order to compose five cues for each group. However, the
broad goal of this study was to test the applicability of paralinguistic cues to confessions, rather
than the efficacy of the specific cues presented.
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Phase II Measures
After the videos, the six audio-recorded confessions were provided as stimuli for
participants to judge as ‘true’ or ‘false’. Each confession was presented on a separate webpage
with a set of questions regarding judgment of veracity, confidence level, and specific cues
considered in judgment. Participants were prevented from returning to already submitted
webpages. No feedback regarding accuracy was given at any point during or after the survey.
Judgment of veracity was obtained using a dichotomous rating of either ‘true’ or ‘false’.
The confidence in judgment rating was obtained using a six-point Likert scale ranging from 0
(not at all confident) to 5 (completely confident) with a midpoint of 2.5. Information on the
specific cues from the video considered by participants in their judgment of the confession was
obtained through a multiple selection question for the five cues from the corresponding video
with an open-answer “other” option. This question allowed the participant to indicate which of
the cues, if any, they noticed or used to judge a specific confession. The open-answer “other”
option collected any alternative information that the participants considered in judging veracity.
Demographic information regarding age, gender, race & ethnicity, and student status was
collected at the end of the survey. A final question assessed any technical issues that may have
been experienced by the participant. Technical issues did not appear to be an issue for
participants with only one participant indicating difficulty with listening to a single recording.
The final page of the survey consisted of a thank you notification, an explanation of the lottery
entry process, and contact information for the researchers. The survey software, Qualtrics,
collected time information for each participant regarding how many seconds/minutes were spent
on a given page of the survey.
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Results
Research Question 1 evaluated the efficacy of conducting an online experimental survey
on deception detection in comparison to traditional, in-person experiments. Distribution resulted
in an estimated 19% response rate (i.e. opening survey) and a 7.6% completion rate. Survey time
information obtained through Qualtrics was used to exclude participants falling below the
minimum time required to complete each training video and audio-recording.
Sixty-three valid surveys were analyzed out of 159 total (i.e. complete and incomplete)
surveys collected. During data collection, 159 individual survey results were collected. Note that
Qualtrics software submits incomplete surveys after one week of inactivity. A survey time
variable was calculated to assess minutes spent within the survey by each participant using
indicators of date/time begun and date/time of last activity. Thirty-five surveys were excluded
due to no time spent on survey. Five surveys were excluded due to participants indicating their
student status as not undergraduate. Qualtrics allows the addition of timing questions on each
survey page that can indicate the time (in seconds) that a participant spends on a given page
before submitting the page and continuing onto the next. These timing variables allowed the
assessment of how long a participant spent on the video page and on each confession page in
order to fully watch the video and fully listen to each audio-recording. The minimum required
time to complete the activities was estimated to be 20 minutes. Forty-five surveys were excluded
due to total survey time falling below 20 minutes. Note that these 45 surveys included
incomplete surveys that contained no data. Eleven surveys were excluded because survey time
exceeded three hours, which raised concerns about the effectiveness of the training after a
significant period of time. Note that the majority of the surveys falling over the acceptable time
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were also incompletes where participants left the survey at some point but did not close out of
the browser until the following day or days later.
Research Question 2 examined the overall accuracy of participants in comparison to
chance levels of accuracy. The overall accuracy rate of participants was 52.9% (n = 63), which
did not differ significantly from chance levels, t(62) = 1.12, p = N.S, d = .141. Accuracy rates per
each of the six confessions ranged from 36.1% to 71.7%, indicating variability in accuracy rates
across each individual confession (See Table 2).
Table 2
Accuracy Rates and Mean Confidence Across Confessions
Mean
N
Accuracy %
Confidence
True Confession #1
60
60.0
3.38
True Confession #2
60
71.7
3.50
True Confession #3
61
36.1
3.16
False Confession #1
62
58.1
3.40
False Confession #2
61
47.5
2.95
False Confession #3
59
42.4
3.21
All True Confessions
62
55.7
3.35
All False
63
50.3
3.19
Confessions
All Confessions
63
52.9
3.27
Note: Confidence was scaled from 0 – 5, with a midpoint of 2.5

SD
Confidence
1.34
1.48
1.07
1.37
1.42
1.41
1.01
1.06
0.95

Research Question 3 examined the association between participants’ accuracy in
identifying true and false confessions and their confidence level in the judgment. Correlational
analyses showed that the overall accuracy rate and mean confidence across all confessions were
not significantly correlated (r = .027, p = N.S). Confidence in true confession judgments was not
significantly correlated to accuracy in judging true confessions (r = .145, p = N.S) and
confidence in false confession judgments was not significantly correlated to accuracy in judging
false confessions (r = (-) .089, p = N.S). Despite the nonsignificant findings, the correlational
coefficient of confidence in true confessions is positive and slightly higher than the coefficient of
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confidence in false confessions. The confidence rating scale ranged from 0 (not at all confident)
to 5 (completely confident) with a midpoint of 2.5. The average rating of confidence for true
confessions (M = 3.35, SD = 1.01) was slightly higher than the average rating of confidence for
false confessions (M = 3.19, SD = 1.06), with an overall average rating of confidence of 3.27 (SD
= 0.95) (See Table 2). Both groups had mean confidence levels above the scale mid-point of 2.5
(See Figure 2).
Research Question 4 examined if training in paralingustic cues would increase accuracy
in identifying true and false confessions in comparison to a placebo training. An independentsamples t-test was conducted to examine differences in accuracy between the paralingustic
training group and the control group. The results indicated that the mean accuracy rate of the
paralingustic group (M = .553, SD = .202) was higher than mean accuracy rate of the control
group (M = .508, SD = .210), however the difference was not found to be statistically significant
t(61) = .870, p = N.S, d = .22. Figure 1 displays the means accuracy rates for confessions by
condition.
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Figure 1: Accuracy Rates in Identifying Confessions By Group

Research Question 5 compared accuracy rates between true and false confessions for all
participants combined in order to test for the presence of a truth bias in the sample. A truth bias
would be indicated by significantly higher accuracy for true confessions in comparison to false
confessions. The accuracy rate of true confessions was 55.7% (n = 62) and the accuracy rate of
identifying false confessions was 50.3% (n = 63). A paired-samples t-test was conducted to
evaluate if accuracy rates differed between true and false confessions. Although the accuracy rate
of true confessions (M = .557, SD = 258) was higher than the accuracy rate for false confessions
(M = .503, SD = .300), this difference was not significant t(62) = 1.131, p = N.S., d = .14.
Research Question 6 examined differences between the paralingustic and control groups
in terms of confidence in judgment. An independent-samples t-test was conducted to examine
differences in confidence level. The results indicated that the mean confidence rating of the
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paralingustic group (M = 3.52, SD = .184) was significantly higher than mean confidence rating
of the control group (M = 3.05, SD = .149), t(61) = 2.017, p = .048, d = 0.51 (See Figure 2).
Figure 2. Mean Confidence Level in Judgment of True and False Confessions By group

Finally, Research Question 7 tested the manipulation effect of the experiment by
examining the frequency of cues from the training videos that were indicated as relevant to
participants’ judgments. Participants in each condition indicated which cues, if any, from their
training video were used in judging veracity, with an option to write-in other cues (see Table 3
for frequency of cues used by group type). The frequency counts indicate that the paralingustic
group (f =304) indicated a greater number of cues relevant to their judgment in comparison to
the control group (f =129).
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Table 3
Frequency of Cues Used By Participant Group
Paralingustic Group

f

%

Longer Pause Durations

75

22.3%

Speech Errors

69

20.5%

High Pitch

62

18.5%

Phrase/Word Repetition

58

17.3%

40
304

11.9%
100.0%

Speech Time
All Paralingustic Cues

Control Group

f

%

High Self-Monitoring
Extroversion vs.
Introversion
Presence of Personality
Disorder
Cross-Cultural
Differences
Language Differences
All Control Cues

58

45.0%

46

35.7%

12

9.3%

7

5.4%

6
129

4.7%
100.0%

Participants also provided qualitative information using the open-text answer underneath
the ‘other’ option on the multiple answer question regarding specific cues considered relevant to
their judgment. No character length limited the answers and some were extensive (e.g. “she had
heavier breathing and small sighs in the pauses making it seem as though she was telling a lie or
was struggling to make a story”). Participant were able to indicate cues of their own, rather than
choosing cues from their training, such as “changes in tone” or “upspeak” from participants in
the paralingustic trainings. For example, one participant in the placebo training wrote in “lack of
empathy” for a judgment of deception. Most commonly, however, participants in the
paralingustic confessions wrote in cues that matched their training such as “ums”, “speech
hesitation”, “sights, ums”, “use of ums, ahs”, “a lot of hesitation noises”, “speech hesitation”,
“lots of ‘um’”, “um’s and uh’s”, “semi-frequent ‘uhm’s’ and ‘uh’s’”, “said ‘um’ numerous
times”, “hesitation ("ums" & "uhs")”, “some phrases jumbled together”, “too many ‘ums’",
“[quiet] talk, mumbling”, “voice inflection”, and “pausing”. Conversely, some participants in the
paralingustic training mentioned verbal cues, such as “inconsistencies in story”, “less plausible
story”, “this is implausible”, and “lack of specificity”. These responses indicated that participants
used the open-text options mostly to elaborate on or reaffirm their choices out of the cues
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provided through their training, but a few participants mentioned cues outside of their training as
relevant to their judgment.
Discussion
This study tested whether training in paralingustic cues to deception increased accuracy
in identifying true and false confessions, the association between confidence in judgment and
accuracy, and the efficacy of a conducting experiments on deception detection online. Consistent
with prior research on deception detection, the combined accuracy rate of all participants was not
significantly different from chance levels and confidence was not found to be related to accuracy
– either positively or negatively (Research Questions 2 and 3). Deception detection accuracy on
true and false statements tends to be around chance levels regardless of law enforcement
experience or confidence (Aamodt & Custer, 2006). With respect to true and false confessions
specifically, confidence has also been indicated to be unrelated to accuracy (Kassin et al., 2005).
Contrary to expectation, there were no significant difference in the accuracy rates of the
paralingustic and control groups (Research Question 4). Despite the observed non-zero effect
size (i.e 0.22) of training on the accuracy of the paralingustic group, the mean difference between
the groups was not statistically significant. These results do not indicate that all paralingustic
cues are ineffective in identifying true or false confessions, rather that the training using this
particular set of paralingustic cues is not suggested to be effective in identifying these true and
false confessions.
Prior research had not considered the applicability of paralingustic deception detection
cues to true and false confession; instead, the few studies testing the applicability of deception
detection cues to confessions focused on verbal cues. Verbal deception detection cues have also,
on the whole, not been applicable to true and false confessions to the same extent as to true and
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false exculpatory statements. This was indicated in Appleby et al.’s (2013) and Garrett’s (2010)
content analyses of false confessions, which found extensive visual and auditory details in false
confessions, although paucity of such detail is a cue to deception in false exculpatory statements
(Bond & DePaulo, 2008; Vrij, 2008a). Moreover, Willén & Strömwall (2012) found that two
empirically-tested measures of verbal cues to deception (i.e. Statement Validity Analysis, Reality
Monitoring) did not distinguish between true and false confessions and only a minor subset of
the individual cues were able to do so. Vrij’s (2008) meta-analysis, failed to provide strong
support for these individual cues indicated in Willén & Strömwall’s (2012) study to effectively
distinguish between true and false confessions. This meta-analysis, however, examined studies
that had tested all types of true and false statements, not just confessions. Overall, research has
been encouraging in the efficacy of empirically-supported paralingustic and verbal cues to
deception in identifying true and false statements (Vrij, 2008a; Vrij, Edward, & Bull, 2001). The
findings of the present study and studies examining verbal deception detection cues in
confessions suggest that deception detection cues indicated as effective in identifying true and
false statements may have a differential relationship to true and false confessions.
Interestingly, participants did not show a higher rate of accuracy in identifying true
confessions in comparison to false confessions (Research Question 5), contrary to expectations.
Despite a small, non-zero effect size (0.14) of type of statement (true vs. false) on accuracy rates,
the difference between accuracy of identifying true and false confessions was not statistically
significant. This lack of truth bias, demonstrated by participants in this study differs from prior
research on participants’ judgments of true and false statements. Investigators tend to have a
“guilt bias” – an increased likelihood of judging both true confessions and false confessions as
true and the suspect as guilty (Kassin et al., 2005; Burgoon et al., 2009). Participants who are not

43

APPLYING DECEPTION DETECTION TO TRUE AND FALSE CONFESSIONS

trained investigators, however, demonstrate a ‘truth bias’ and, thus, are more likely to judge true
statements as true than false statements as false (Levine et al., 1999; Vrij & Baxter, 1999). The
findings of the present study suggest that the “truth bias” may not be demonstrated when
identifying true and false confessions. As confessions may qualitatively differ from the types of
statements (e.g. exculpatory statements, social conversation) used in prior deception detection
research (e.g. Kassin et al., 2003, Anderson et al., 1999), participants may assess confessions
differently than other types of statements.
Confidence in judgment of true and false confessions was not found to be significantly
related to accuracy of identifying true and false confessions, although participants across both
groups demonstrated levels of confidence above the scale midpoint. Moreover, participants in the
paralingustic group indicated significantly higher confidence than participants in the control
group (Research Question 6). The finding that confidence increases but accuracy does not
increase due to training highlights a concerning trend in deception detection research. With
specific regard to confessions, trained investigators also demonstrate poor accuracy and
increased confidence. In the study which provided the methodology for obtaining true and false
confessions for the present study, Kassin et al. (2005) found that trained investigators were less
accurate at identifying true and false confessions in comparison to untrained students, but they
were more confident in their judgments. Trained investigators were not only overconfident in
their abilities, but they also displayed a “guilt bias” which resulted in an increased perception of
both true and false confessions as true. Prior research has generally indicated that trained
investigators, in comparison to untrained participants, indicate higher confidence in deception
detection abilities while not displaying higher rates of accuracy (Meissner & Kassin, 2004). The
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implications of this discrepancy between confidence and deception detection ability will be later
discussed.
Confidence may have been increased for the paralingustic group because participants in
the control group did not find their cues to deception relevant to the same extent as participants
in the paralingustic group, and thus were less confident in their judgments. This is supported by
the difference in frequency of cues indicated as relevant to judgment between the groups.
Participants in the paralingustic group indicated a higher frequency of cues from their training as
relevant to their judgments. This may suggest that the paralingustic training was more useful to
the decision-making of participants than the control training (Research Question 7). However, it
is important to note that the control condition was a placebo training and the participants had no
knowledge that their training would be inapplicable to the confessions. Cues of the placebo
training such as self-monitoring or extroversion vs. introversion, which were the most frequently
indicated by participants, could have been construed by participants to be present in the
confession. None of the placebo cues were explicitly mentioned or alluded to in the confessions,
however participants were not prevented from attributing qualities to the individual telling
confession based on the content of the confession.
Conducting online experimental studies appears to be resource-effective, with less effort
required in soliciting participants and minimal researcher investment (Research Question 1). The
response rate of the survey in the present study was low. Low response rates tend to increase the
likelihood that a sample is not representative of the population examined, which decreases the
external validity of the findings. The low completion rate suggests there may be a trade-off
between lower researcher investment and a lower participation rate. Fewer participants may be
recruited online than in person. However, a researcher may conduct multiple distributions to
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multiple participant pools, resulting in more solicitation than may otherwise be possible through
in-person recruitment. Experimental studies may reach more extensive participant pools through
venues like Mechanical Turk, which provides more diverse participants than typical college
samples (Buhrmester, Kwang, & Gosling, 2011). Like in-person experiments, an online survey
can eliminate invalid participation through collected time information and can obtain qualitative
feedback.
Implications
The results of this study regarding poor judgment accuracy and increased confidence due
to training have serious implications for interrogational practices and assessment of confessions
provided by suspects. Training in deception detection, especially if it appears scientifically-based
and objective, appears to increase confidence in deception detection ability, regardless of actual
increases in deception detection ability. Trained investigators who are confident in their ability to
detect deception appear to be poorer in their ability to detect true and false exculpatory
statements (i.e. denials), being more likely to perceive denials provided by suspects as deceptive
(Meissner & Kassin, 2002). Training in deception detection cues that are not empiricallysupported may be to blame for the poor accuracy of trained investigators. For instance, the Reid
technique increases the confidence of trained individuals in their judgments of true and false
exculpatory statements, however it does not increase accuracy in identification of true and false
statements with both students and trained investigators (Kassin & Fong, 1999; Meissner &
Kassin, 2002).
The “guilt bias” and unfounded confidence in deception detection ability is detrimental to
the identification of innocent suspects because higher confidence is associated with increasing
use of interrogational practices that may elicit false confessions. The increase in confidence of
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investigators is also associated with an inclination to presume the guilt of a suspect, and
investigators may fall prey to the confirmation bias during interrogation, which leads
investigators to selectively seek and perceive new information in ways that support their belief of
guilt (Kassin & Gudjonsson, 2004). The confirmation bias was demonstrated in Kassin et al.’s
(2007) experiment which found that investigators’ special training in interrogation and greater
confidence in their own deception detection skills lead them to presume guilt and to more
frequently use psychological manipulation and confrontational techniques when interrogating
suspects. Investigators who expected a suspect to be guilty perceived plausible denials as
resistance to the interrogation and evidence of guilt. Investigators who expected a suspect to be
innocent, in turn, perceived denials as more plausible. When confidence in deception detection
ability is paired with a poor ability to actually detect deception, interrogators may assume
assuredly that their interrogation will oust the guilty but they fail to identify when an innocent
suspect provides a false confession.
The present study contributed to research on true and false confessions in several ways.
First, the experimental design of the study demonstrated that empirically-supported deception
detection training increases confidence in deception detection ability in a sample that was
previously untrained in deception detection. This differs from prior research that had used
experienced investigators who were possibly trained in multiple or empirically-unsupported
deception detection techniques (e.g. Kassin et al., 2005). Second, it questions the applicability of
paralingustic deception detection cues to confession statements, which had not previously been
tested. Although paralingustic or auditory cues to deception appear to be more effective in
identifying true and false statements (Anderson et al., 1999; DePaulo, Lassiter, & Stone, 1982),
this study found that training in paralingustic cues did not contribute to significantly higher rates
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of accuracy of identifying true and false confessions. Finally, this study examined a new method
to conduct experiments on deception detection by designing an experimental survey to distribute
to participants online. A qualitative evaluation of this method suggests that it has the potential to
minimize researchers’ invested time and effort, however, additional research is needed to
determine the feasibility of different research questions or the ability to obtain a desired sample
size.
Thus, future researchers are encouraged to test this methodology to determine if online
experimental surveys can be comparable to traditional, in-person experiments. It is important to
design experimental studies with trainings to present empirically-supported cues to deception
and approaches that are consistent with research on interrogation techniques. It is a possibility
that online experimental studies on deception detection may be more effective for certain
research questions that may not have as many limitations as the present study had. For instance,
evaluating the effects of gender or mood on perceived veracity of true and false statements may
be more feasible for online experimental surveys than testing the efficacy of a training in
deception detection.
Additional research is needed on the applicability of paralingustic cues to confession
statements, which can examine different paralingustic cues, the effects of a different training
design, or the utility of paralingustic cues in distinguishing between true and false criminal
confessions. The present study used confessions to non-criminal events or actions. Alternatively,
future studies may explore additional applications of deception detection cues to confessions,
such as verbal or nonverbal cues, and combinations of different cues. Identifying other types of
false statements such as false witness statements is another direction in which future research on
deception detection may contribute to the prevention of false convictions. The importance of this
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direction is emphasized by Wilson (2003), who found that wrongful convictions may be caused
partly by testimony of “smooth and convincing” liars as witnesses.
Limitations
This study faced several limitations. In terms of the methodology to elicit true and false
confessions, there was a lack of corroborative evidence for the true confessions. Participants
were asked to provide a true confession to an event that elicited feelings or guilt of
embarrassment, however, no verification was conducted to ensure that their confessions were
true. False confessions, on the other hand, were known to be false as the material for the
confession was provided to participants during the procedure.
The experimental and control groups each had 30 and 32 participants, respectively. The
low sample size may have contributed to a lower likelihood of differences in accuracy rates
between the groups from being detected. Regarding differences in accuracy rates between the
paralingustic and control groups, it is important to note that sample size (N = 63) may have fallen
short of estimated required sample size to achieve adequate statistical power. Post-hoc power
analyses using the G*Power computer program (Faul & Erdfelder, 1998) confirmed that the
study was underpowered with achieved power of 0.14. A total sample of approximately 210
participants would be needed to obtain statistical power at the recommended .80 level (Cohen,
1988) assuming a large effect size of .5. A medium effect size (0.5) was detected for the
difference in mean confidence levels between the groups, however, it is inconclusive if the nonsignificant effect size of mean differences in accuracy rates (0.22) between the paralingustic and
control groups would hold up in future studies.
Further, the experimental training video on paralingustic cues may have been too brief to
be effective. As Frank and Feeley (2003) indicate, an effective training in lie detection needs to
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include the following elements: relevance, high stakes, proper implementation, empirical testing,
generalizability across contexts, and generalizability over time. The training videos offered no
exercises to test deception detection with feedback on performance. Receiving feedback on
performance may have allowed participants to learn from their mistakes, but may have
confounded the assessment of confidence in judgment for participants. Further, feedback on
performance is not provided when deception detection is required in the real world where
practitioners must often rely on only their own judgment.
Another possible limitation is the external validity of participants’ assessment of
confessions as stimuli. The participants were not able to interact with the individuals providing
the confession or ask follow-up questions, which is possible for investigators in interrogation.
However, research has found that degree of interaction may affect accuracy of identifying true
and false statements in interrogation. Dunbar, Ramirez, and Burgoon (2003) suggest that the very
act of interaction in the interrogational context may create an amplifying effect in terms of a
deception bias in perception of veracity because observers, as opposed to individuals engaged in
the conversation, tend to have higher rates of accuracy in detecting false statements but may be
impaired in identifying true statements. Other research (e.g. Buller et al., 1991, Feeley &
deTurck, 1997) has indicated that observers are better at judging accuracy of a conversation than
those participating in a conversation. However, most of these studies were conducted with
student participants, who are likely to be unfamiliar with interrogational practice and may be
more impaired or distracted by being involved in the conversation. In a study using police
officers as participants, Hartwig, Granhag, Strömwall, & Vrij (2005) found no difference in lie
detection accuracy between interrogators and observers, indicating that this distinction may not
be relevant to the interrogational context.
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External validity is also a consideration because multiple modes of cues may considered
in evaluating veracity in actual assessment. Verbal cues have been found to be empiricallysupported indicators of deception (Vrij, 2008a) and it is likely that practitioners rely on
paralingustic cues in conjunction with verbal and nonverbal cues when judging veracity. Lastly,
it is important to note that the type of deception investigated by deception detection researchers
may not be generalizable to the typical case of false confessions, where the false confessor may
not be motivated to get the interviewer to believe them wholeheartedly, but rather to satisfy an
interviewer who is already convinced of their guilt.
Conclusion
Identification of true and false confessions is a new area of deception detection and few
studies have examined which cues are associated with veracity. Nevertheless, deception
detection approaches hold promise for providing empirically-supported methods of identifying
false confessions in order to prevent false convictions and to avoid high costs to unjustly
convicted individuals and their communities. This study suggests while certain findings from the
deception detection field, such as increased confidence due to training, may hold true for
confessions, paralingustic cues may be less applicable to confessions than to other types of
statements. The method of distributing experimental surveys online to participants is suggested
as an alternative, cost-effective method for conducting experiments on deception detection.
Although deception detection research has only recently begun examining true and false
confessions, there is hope for the development of empirically-based assessment of confession
evidence which, in combination with knowledge on individual and situational risk factors for
false confessions, can help prevent false convictions.
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